University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law

2003

The New Transatlantic Marketplace: A
Contemporary Analysis of United States-European
Union Trade Relations and Possibilities for the
Future
Charles W. Smitherman III

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Smitherman, Charles W. III, "The New Transatlantic Marketplace: A Contemporary Analysis of United States-European Union Trade
Relations and Possibilities for the Future" (2003). Minnesota Journal of International Law. 142.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/142

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.

Article
The New Transatlantic Marketplace: A
Contemporary Analysis of United States -

European Union Trade Relations and Possibilities
for the Future
Charles W. Smitherman III"
253
Introduction .................................................................................
BACKGROUND OF CONTEMPORARY U.S.-EU
I.
ECONOMIC RELATIONS .............................................. 255
255
A . U .S.-EU TRADE .............................................................
B. THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA ............................ 256
C. POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES IN

262
LEGAL BARRIERS TO THE REALIZATION OF
THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC MARKETPLACE ......... 268
A. EU BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT ................. 268
1. E U Import Policies................................................. 269
2. EU Standards,Testing, Labeling, and
270
Certification ................................................................
3. EU Government Procurement................................ 271
4. EU Export Subsidies.............................................. 272
5. IntellectualProperty Rights Protection................. 273
THE U.S.-EU TRADE RELATIONSHIP .................................

II.

Doctoral studies on European Union-United States trade law and regulation,
Faculty of Law, University of Oxford; Visiting Lecturer, University of Georgia School
of Law; Research Associate, Dean Rusk Center-International, Comparative &
Graduate Legal Studies; J.D. 2002, University of Georgia; B.A. 1999, Mercer University.
1. The following sources have been checked for correct bluebook format only.
The author alone represents that the content in these sources supports the author's
proposition. STEPHEN WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EU LAW (3d ed. 1999); Sir
Leon Brittain, Transatlantic Economic Partnership:Breaking Down the Hidden
Barriers, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND
POLITICAL PROSPECTS (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000); GEORGE A. BERMANN
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAw (2d ed. 2002).

252

MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE

[Vo1.12:2

6. Service Barriers......................................................
7. Investm ent Barriers...............................................
8. Trade RestrictionsAffecting Electronic
Com m erce....................................................................
9. Other B arriers........................................................

273
274
275
275

B. U.S. BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT ............... 276

1. U.S. Extraterritorialityand Unilateralism..........
2. U.S. TariffBarriers......................278
3. U.S. Non-Tariff Barriers.......................................
4. U.S. Investment Related Measures .......................
5. IntellectualProperty Rights...................................
6. U.S. Barriersto Services ........................................
III.
THE REALIZATION OF THE NEW
TRANSATLANTIC MARKETPLACE ............................
A . RATIONALE ....................................................................
B. COMPONENTS OF THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC
MARKETPLACE ...................................................................
1. Eliminating Technical Trade Barriers for
Goods ...........................................................................
2. TariffElimination..................................................
3. Freedom of Services ................................................
4. Government Procurement......................................
5. Other Possible Components of the
New TransatlanticMarketplace................................
IV.
THE VIABILITY OF THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC
MARKETPLACE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON
W ORLD TRAD E ...............................................................
C on clu sion ....................................................................................

276
279
283
284
285
286
286
288
289
290
291
291
292
293
296

In a free trade an effectual combination cannot be established but by the unanimous consent of every single member of it,
and it cannot last longer than every single member of it continues of the same mind.2
-Adam Smith

2. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 129 (Katherine Sutherland ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1776).
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INTRODUCTION
The paradigm of time prompts innumerable questions and
uncertainties. The what's, the where's, the how's, the why's, all
defining the happenings and occurrences of the past, all equivocal and capricious of the things to come. Indeed, though history
perpetuates as a fixed, immutable memory, the future remains
unwritten, and open to all possibilities, full of the potential for
progress and growth and the unavoidable hazard of reflux and
regression.
No person, no entity, no relationship remains exempt from
time's paradigm, and nowhere could this model be more applicable on a global scale than in the relations of the United States
and Europe. The Allied victory in World War II and the end of a
near half-century of continent-wide war in Europe led to the initiation of arrangements aimed at averting the reoccurrence of
the past through commonality and economic integration, erecting supportive pillars that would form the foundation of what
would later become known as the European Union (EU).3 The
conquering of fascism spurred the rise of an equally threatening
ideology on Europe's eastern borders, a communist agenda
standing in stark contrast to the democratic, capitalistic ideals
of post-war Europe and its friend and ally, the United States.4
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, in recognition of its common ideological commitment and shared foe, the
United States provided incentives and encouragement to the nation-states of Europe to integrate their economies and foreign
policies, binding themselves so tightly that war between the
European nation- states would be all but impossible. At the
same time, this integration provided the United States with an
economic and political partner in the Cold War.5
As the past defined itself, the future soon arrived. The
U.S.-European relationship blossomed and triumphed as Europe
became a union and communism became a memory. However,
as the law of unintended consequences played itself out, communism lost and Europe became not only a union, but a supranational entity with the capacity and potential to rival that of
its fostering and guiding cohort. The red flags of communism no
longer fly on Europe's eastern borders, serving as a common enemy for the United States and EU to rally against, thereby de3.
4.
5.

See STEPHEN WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EU LAw 1-44 (3d ed. 1999).
See id.
See id.
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stroying the same level of political and economic unity that once
existed. Rallying upon its unification, its growing economic
power, and its rivaling leadership in the international community, the EU now finds itself capable and willing to squabble
with, and contest, the world's sole remaining superpower, its
friend and ally the United States.6
As the paradigm of time unfolds and writes itself, the
United States and the EU find themselves and their relationship at a crossroads. Following a direction defined in 1990 by
the U.S.-EU Transatlantic Declaration,' the how's and the
where's must soon be answered. The U.S.-EU economic alliance
comprises the world's most important trade relationship, together accounting annually for $500 billion in trade in goods
and services!s However, economic disputes before the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and rising apprehensions over competing trade policies continue to emerge, burdening and threatening this valued relationship.! In response to these growing
rifts in transatlantic relations, the Transatlantic Declaration
and the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) of 199510 provide a
framework of measures and informal institutions to facilitate
U.S.-EU economic cooperation. With a view towards addressing
rising disputes and disparities in transatlantic relations, the
NTA also establishes a visionary dream for the future of U.S.EU trade, specifically through the creation of a transatlantic
free trade area, the New Transatlantic Marketplace (NTM).
In an effort to analyze the present and future of U.S.-EU
trade relations, Part I of this article discusses the background
and development of the post-Cold War relationship in the context of the Transatlantic Declaration and the NTA, while considering the dangers and shortcomings of this current framework. Part II analyzes the legal barriers to free trade in the
United States and EU that provoke economic conflicts and disputes amidst the relationship. Part III sets forth the innovative
proposal for the New Transatlantic Marketplace, specifically examining certain components such as the removal of technical
6. See Irwin M. Stelzer, Is Europe a Threat?, COMMENTARY, Oct. 1, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 25550690.
7. Transatlantic Declaration on EC-U.S. Relations, Nov. 22, 1990, U.S.-EU,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external relations/us/economic-partnership/
declaration_1990.htm [hereinafter Transatlantic Declaration].
8. Id.
9. See infra Part II.
10. The New Transatlantic Agenda, 6 DISPATCH 894-97 (1995) [hereinafter
NTA].
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barriers, tariff elimination, freedom of services, government
procurement, and other possible aspects of the proposal. Part
IV concludes with an analysis of the political and economic viability of the NTM and its potential implications on world trade.
I. BACKGROUND OF CONTEMPORARY U.S.-EU ECONOMIC
RELATIONS
A. U.S.-EU TRADE

To characterize the U.S.-EU trade relationship as anything
less than the most important bilateral alliance in international
trade would be a gross understatement. "The flow of transatlantic trade and investments" amounts to upwards of one billion
dollars (U.S.) every day.11 In 2000, EU imports and exports constituted 19.3% (approximately 197,992,000 euros) and 24.79%12

(approximately 232,037,000 euros), respectively, of U.S. trade.
Trade in services made up 40.7% (approximately 116,474,000
euros) and 40.3% (approximately 117,403,000 euros) of EU imports and exports, respectively; while foreign direct investments
amongst the two trading partners calculated to 68% (approximately 121,271,000 euros) of EU inflows, 62.4% (approximately
561,199,000 euros) of inward stocks, 47.5% (approximately
172,027,000 euros) of total EU outflows, and 51.3% (approximately 794,523,000 euros) of outward stocks. '" In essence, the
EU and United States are "each other's two main trading partners" and account for "the largest bilateral trade relationship in
the world." 14
With investment amounts between the two
amounting to over 1.1 trillion euros, 15over fourteen million people in the United States and EU owe their livelihoods to this
transatlantic trade relationship. 16
11.

TransatlanticRelations - The U.S - EU Partnership:U.S. Relations with the

European Union, at http://www.useu.befransAtlantic/Index.html (last visited Apr.
4, 2002).
12.

EUR. UNION, DG TRADE, EU Trade with Main Partners 2000 (Mio euro),

A2/CG/SG/WB, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external-relations/peru/
intro/andean.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
13.
14.

Id.
Bilateral Trade Relations: USA,

at

http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade

/bilateral/usalusa.htm (Oct. 2001).
15.

Id.

16. Thomas R. Pickering, America's Stake in Europe's Future, Address Before
the French American Chamber of Commerce, at http://www.useu.be/ISSUES /pick
1103.html (Nov. 3, 2000).
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The success and viability of the U.S.-EU trade relationship
arises primarily out of similar interests and a common perception of external challenges. A shared commitment to economic
liberalization and a common interest in a particular version of
liberalization and government regulation, uncommon among
other great powers, explains in large part the existence and success of transatlantic trade relations. 17 Though not identical, the
capitalistic styles present in Europe and the United States remain relatively similar in comparison to other types of capitalism found in Asia, "the transitional economies of Eastern
Europe, and the former Soviet Union," as well as the developing
states of Africa and Latin America.' 8 The overall size of the
transatlantic trade relationship, coupled with the common capitalistic view for the future of world trade, supports the assertion
that the economies and societies of the United States and EU
are so intertwined and interdependent that the maintenance
and advancement of the trade relationship must be of the highest economic priority between the two partners. 9
B. THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA

As the apparent significance of the U.S.-EU trade relationship grows increasingly important, the New Transatlantic
Agenda (NTA) of 1995 provides the framework for managing and
expanding general U.S.-EU cooperation. 20 Expanding upon the
formalization of U.S.-European Community relations adopted in
the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration, the NTA establishes an
ambitious agenda in four areas, namely Expanding Cooperation
on Promoting Peace, Stability, Democracy, and Development
Around the World; Responding to Global Challenges; Building
Bridges Across the Atlantic; and, pertinent to this discussion,
Contributing to the Expansion of World Trade and Closer Economic Relations."
The U.S.-EU economic-related commitments under the NTA
17. Richard H. Steinberg, Great Power Management of the World Trading System: A Transatlantic Strategy for Liberal Multilateralism, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L

Bus. 205, 219 (1998).
18. Id. at 220.
19. Pickering, supra note 16; see also Pascal Lamy, U.S. - EU: The Biggest
Trading Elephants in the Jungle - But Will They Behave?, Address Before the Economic Strategy Institute, at http://www.eurunion.org/news/speeches/2001/010607pl
.htm (June 7, 2001).
20. Press Release, U.S. Department of State, The New Transatlantic Agenda,
at http://www.state.gov./www/region/eur/eu/fs-980526-nta.html (May 26, 1998).
21. NTA, supra note 10, at art. II.

2003]

THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC MARKETPLACE

highlight several important areas that have shaped and will
continue to foster the relationship in the future. Specifically,
the NTA recognizes a responsibility between the United States
and EU to lead the world in opening markets to trade and investment and to strengthen and support the multilateral trading system and the WTO.22 The two parties also pledge themselves to the full implementation of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 28 (GATT) Uruguay Round commitments 24 and
to explore the possibility of tariff reductions on industrial products. 25 More specific aspects of the NTA include: a promise to
strengthen regulatory cooperation to address trade barriers resulting from divergent regulatory processes through a mutual
recognition agreement; to work towards the successful completion of an Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Multilateral Agreement on Investment; and, to
conclude a U.S.-European Community customs cooperation and
mutual assistance agreement.2 6 In order to effectuate these
pledges, and other non-economic pacts contained within the
agreement, the NTA establishes a Senior Level Group to oversee
work on the agenda, as well as regular summits
between the
27
U.S. President and governing leaders of the EU.
Arising out of the implementation of the NTA, the Joint
U.S.-EU Action Plan 2 8 commits the United States and the EU to
numerous measures.2 9 Recognizing the importance of the U.S.EU trade relationship, the Action Plan specifically amplifies the
Expansion of World Trade and Closer Economic Relations section to address precise issues affecting U.S.-EU trade, as well as
global trade as a whole." Of noteworthy importance remain
commitments to strengthen the WTO and the worldwide trading
system through cooperative efforts to promote effective management and operation in the WTO; to promote financial service
liberalization worldwide; to ensure the implementation of the
22. Id. at art. III.
23. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
24. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
25. NTA, supra note 10, at art. III.
26. Id. at art. III.
27. Id.
28. Joint EU - U.S. Action Plan, at http://www.eurunion.org/partner/act
plan.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
29. See generally id.
30. NTA, supra note 10, at art. III.
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WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS); to the development of a comprehensive model for
customs procedures in cooperation with the International
Chamber of Commerce; and, to the implementation of the 1994
OECD Recommendation on Bribery in International Transactions.3 '
Within the framework of the U.S.-EU Action Plan, the
Transatlantic Economic Partnership 2 (TEP) initiative, launched
in 1998, establishes another Action Plan to "intensify and extend multilateral and bilateral cooperation and common action"
in the area of trade and investment." Demonstrating a more
defined resolution to the furtherance of the trade relationship,
the TEP exhibits an evolution and expansion of the NTA and
Action Plans by replacing broad, general propositions with a
specific identification of common actions accompanied by a timetable for achieving definite results.3 4 The TEP also establishes a
regular dialogue to ensure closer cooperation in the 1999 WTO
Ministerial meeting, identifying certain issues for discussion
such as, modalities and principles for negotiation; WTO dispute
settlement; transparency; implementation of WTO agreements;
trade facilitation; a broad work program for the reduction of industrial tariffs; and, cooperation on various WTO issues to secure reports on competition and procurement.3'
On the bilateral front, the TEP provides the means for joint
U.S.-EU intensive efforts aimed to reduce or eliminate trade
and investment barriers. For example, the TEP establishes
deadlines for particular actions within the areas of regulatory
cooperation, mutual recognition, consumer product safety, services, procurement, biotechnology, the environment, labor, consumers, competition law, and e-commerce.3 ' Specific examples
of the concrete steps initiated under TEP include: the implementation of a jointly defined set of principles and guidelines for
regulatory cooperation by the end of 1999; the identification of
conditions allowing for the removal of trade sanctions initiated
by both parties by the end of 1999; and, the establishment of a
TEP Environment Group to focus on the interface of trade and
31. See id.
32. The Transatlantic Economic Partnership: Action Plan, Nov. 9, 1998,
at http://www.europa.eu.intlcomm/trade/bilateral/usall109tep.htm
[hereinafter
TEP].
33. Id. § 1.
34. See generally id.
35. Id. §§ 2.1-2.2.
36. See id. § 3.
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37
the environment by January 1999.
In order to execute the pledges taken, the TEP seeks to create an organizational framework enabling the United States
and EU to effectively implement the TEP Action Plan. Cabinetlevel meetings designed to maintain political momentum and
resolve problems requiring deliberation at the political level
supplement the U.S.-EU biannual summits. 38 A TEP Steering
Group, comprised of specialized working groups, monitors the
realization of TEP objectives and agreements, provides a forum
for business, environmental, consumer, and labor dialogues, establishes a framework for consultation and early warning on
matters of trade and investment relevance and submits regular
reports to the U.S. President and Presidents of the European
Commission and European Council.39
Perhaps the most productive results of the NTA framework,
the subsequent Joint Action Plan, and the TEP Action Plan may
be the establishment of various forums and dialogues designed
to identify and address various trade and investment related
barriers and issues. Specialized working groups, such as the
TEP Working Group on Technical Barriers to Trade4 ° and the
TEP Working Group on Biotechnology,4 1 provide the TEP Steering Group with information and recommendations pertinent to
their respective areas. In addition, various dialogues, such as
the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD),42 the Transatlantic Environment Dialogue (TAED), the Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue (TCD), the Transatlantic Labour Dialogue (TALD),
and the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD), comprised of
various businesses, associations, community leaders, and organizations, provide an informal process whereby European and
U.S. actors develop joint U.S.-EU recommendations while working with various EU institutions and U.S. administrative offices.43

37. Id.
38. TEP, supra note 32, § 4.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. The TABD has perhaps been the most effective measure established
through recent U.S.-EU economic cooperation, providing a forum for important
business leaders from both sides of the Atlantic to boost trade and investment opportunities and to propose legislation to U.S. and EU governing authorities. The enactment of legislative proposals from the TABD, though varying from year to year,
has been quite successful. See generally Transatlantic Business Dialogue, at
http://www.tabd.org/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2002).
43. For example, the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue facilitates biannual
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The Early Warning Mechanism" (EWM) represents another
important result of the TEP implementation. Through a statement from the 1999 Bonn Summit, the EU and United States
set forth numerous principles to recognize and prevent potential
trade disputes at an early stage before the issues escalate politically and legally.45 Taking into account the other side's interest
when formulating policy, legislation, and regulations, the EWM
relies on transparency through mutual information exchange
and consultation for issues raised that may impact U.S.-EU relations.46 Essentially, this device is designed to prevent and
avert trade and investment disputes by dealing with potential
problems early in the process and conciliating on such matters
before they become trade barriers. The EWM invites input from
the TLD, TABD, TACD, and TALD to identify problems and offer proposals for resolution, while proposing that identified
problems 47under the EWM be discussed at the biannual U.S.-EU
summits.
Evaluations regarding the success of the NTA and subsequent initiatives remain divergent and mixed. Perhaps one of
the most important agreements to arise out of the transatlantic
partnership may be the U.S.-EU Mutual Recognition Agreement 4' (MRA), which went into effect in 1998. 49 Providing for
mutual recognition of conformity assessments of industrial
products conducted by Conformity Assessment Bodies," the
MRA seeks to avoid duplication of controls and increase transparency of procedures, while bringing products into the market
faster and more efficiently in six industrial sectors. 51 As demeetings between U.S. Congress and EU Parliament delegations and a series of
teleconferences based on specific topics. See TLD - TransatlanticLegislators'Dialogue, at http://www.europparl.eu.int/intcoop/tld/welcome-en.htm (last visited Apr.
13, 2002); see, e.g., TransatlanticBusiness Dialogue,supra note 42.
44. TEP, supra note 32, § 4; Joint U.S.-EU Statement on 'Early Warning"
Mechanism, at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/pdf/early-warning.pdf (June
21, 1999).
45. Joint U.S.-EU Statement on "Early Warning" Mechanism, supra note 44.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Agreement on Mutual Recognition Between the United States of America
and the European Community, 1999 O.J. (L 31) 3 [hereinafter MRA].
49. Agreements in Force - EU and the U.S. Mutual Recognition Agreement, at
(last visited Apr. 4,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/goods/barriers/mrausa.htm
2002) [hereinafter Agreements in Force].
50. See generally MRA, supra note 48.
51. See id. These sectors include telecommunication equipment, electromagnetic compatibility, electrical safety, recreational craft, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices.
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signed, the MRA should save consumers and manufacturers
upwards of 200 million euros per year.52 Perhaps more importantly, the MRA represents a key step towards integrating the
U.S. and EU regulatory regimes and is significant in demonstrating that such advancements are possible and may be replicated and expanded upon in the future.
In addition to the implementation of the MRA, other successes in U.S.-EU trade relations owe their inception to the
NTA. Generally, the broadening of U.S.-EU dialogue and cooperation remain the essential achievement of the NTA.53 Specifically, by aligning U.S. and EU goals and support, the NTA aided
the development of important multilateral arrangements such
as the Information Technology Agreement, 54 the Basic Telecommunication Services Agreement," and the Financial Services
Agreement,56 which serve to liberalize about 1 trillion euros in
the world goods and services trade.5 7 These achievements, in
addition to those discussed previously, prove the relative success
of the NTA; however, much room for development and improvement exists.
As assessed by various EU institutions, the success of the
NTA remains evident, but limited.5 8 The NTA undoubtedly
nourishes a broader and more structured relationship between
the United States and EU; however, as noted by the European
Commission, neither the NTA, nor its subsequent arrangements, can effectively solve certain underlying difficulties present in the U.S.-EU trade relationship.59 Indeed, though the
present framework remains capable of bearing a limited load in
the ever evolving and growing complexities of the world's largest
economic relationship, perhaps a developing NTA dream will

52. Agreements in Force, supra note 49.
53. See Reinforcing the Transatlantic Relationship: Focusing on Strategy and
Delivering Results: Communication from the Commission to the Council,
COM(01)154 final at 9 [hereinafter Commission Communication].
54. WTO Ministerial Conference, MinisterialDeclarationon Trade in Information Technology Products, WT/MIN(96)/16 (Dec. 13, 1996).
55. Agreement on Telecommunications Services, Fourth Protocol to General
Agreement on Trade in Services, Feb. 15, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 354 (1997).
56. Financial Services Agreement, available at www.wto.org (last visited Apr.
20, 2002).
57. Economic Relations, at http://europa.eu.intcomm/external-relations/us/
action-planI3_trade-economy-release.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
58. See Commission Communication, supra note 53, at 9; Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on 'Re-invigorating the Transatlantic Partnership and
Dialogue,' 2001 O.J. (C 221) 113.
59. See Commission Communication, supra note 53, at 2.
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provide additional answers and certainty, namely through the
New Transatlantic Marketplace (NTM).6 °
Constituting one of the most visionary and progressive
ideas of the NTA, the NTM remains a real possibility for advocates in both the United States and EU. Essentially described
as a U.S.-EU "economic space," the NTM will aim to gradually
reduce and eliminate tariffs and trade barriers while working to
harmonize sophisticated trade and regulatory policies such as
subsidies, intellectual property protection, government procurement, investment measures, and the establishment and
movement of good and services. 61 This matter is discussed in
greater detail in Section III of this work, as it remains necessary
to discuss the barriers and obstacles the U.S. and EU must overcome before the realization of the NTM.
C. POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE U.S.-EU
TRADE RELATIONSHIP
While the framework of the NTA provides a forum facilitating many great strides and advancements in the U.S.-EU trade
relationship, rancor and difficulties still pervade many aspects
of transatlantic trade. While the EWM, various legislative and
business dialogues, and biannual summits serve to prevent and
reconcile some trade related disputes, in many cases high-profile
adjudication before the WTO's dispute settlement bodies remains the only answer. 62 This section briefly discusses the use
of the WTO by the United States and EU in trade dispute settlement, as well as other practical matters that serve to impede
the progress of the realization of a U.S.-EU "economic space."
Since the WTO and the dispute settlement process entered
into force in 1995, nearly half of the disputes brought before an
arbitration panel involved the United States and EU as complainants, respondents, or third-party interveners.63 Various
U.S. complaints regarding EU policies include: EU-Hormone
Ban 4 (commonly known as the Beef Hormones dispute); EU-

60.
61.
62.
63.

See NTA, supra note 10, at art. III.
See id.
See, e.g., infra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
See generally Update of all WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, at http://

www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dispu e.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2002).
64. See WTO Appellate Body Report, EC - Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 1246, available at
www.wto.org.
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Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas,"
and the EU-Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs. 6 The EU has
launched significantly more challenges to U.S. trade policies, including ones aimed at the U.S.-Foreign Sales Corporation Tax
Provisions;6 7 U.S.-Harbor Maintenance Fee; 68 U.S.-Measures Affecting Textiles and Apparel;6 9 U.S.-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act; 70 and Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 and
Amendments Thereto. 71 In addition to many of these highly
publicized disputes, numerous issues currently stand on the
verge of likely adjudication, including biotechnology and geneti73
72
cally modified organisms, steel safeguard measures, and
65. WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9. 1997), 37
I.L.M. 243 (1998), available at www.wto.org and 1997 WL 577784.
66. See WTO Dispute Panel Report, EU - Protection of Trademarks and GeographicalIndicationsfor Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174 (Feb. 14,
2003), available at www.wto.org (indicating that the complaint by the United States
contending EC Regulation 2081/92 does not provide national treatment with respect
to geographical indications or sufficient protection to pre-existing trademarks that
are similar or identical to geographical indication).
67. See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations"Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS108/ABIRW (Jan. 14, 2002), 41 I.L.M. 447 (2002), available at
www.wto.org and 2002 WL 44907 (last visited Mar. 5, 2003).
68. See WTO Dispute Panel Report, Request for Consultationsby the European
Communities, United States - Harbour Maintenance Tax, WTIDS118/1 (Feb. 16,
1998), available at www.wto.org and 1998 WL 61306.
69. See WTO Dispute Panel Report, U.S. - MeasuresAffecting Textiles and Apparel Products, WT/DS151, available at www.wto.org (representing one of several
WTO decisions concerning this issue).
70. See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States - Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002), 41 I.L.M. 654 (2002),
available at www.wto.org and 2002 WTL 5173.
71. See WTO Dispute Panel Report, Request for Consultationsby the European
Communities, United States - Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Amendments
Thereto, WTIDS200/1 (Jun. 13, 2000), available at www.wto.org and 2000 WL
761618; see WTO Panel Report, United States - Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of
1974, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999), 39 I.L.M. 452 (2000), available at www.wto.org
and 1999 WL 1267266.
72. See generally Charles W. Smitherman, World Trade OrganizationAdjudication of the European Union-United States Dispute Over the Moratoriumon the Introduction of New Genetically Modified Foods to the European Common Market: A
Hypothetical Opinion of the Dispute Panel, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 475 (2002)
(setting forth the likely position of the WTO Dispute Panel finding the EU de facto
moratorium an arbitrary, unjustifiable, and disguised restriction on trade under Article XX of the GATT, in the event this matter is adjudicated).
73. See Press Release, European Union, EU Forcefully Condemns U.S. International Trade Commission's Recommendation to Hike Tariffs on Steel Products (Dec.
10, 2001), at http://www.europa.eu.int/commltrade/bilateral/usa /pr20011211.htm

MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol. 12:2

competition law and merger related issues.74
The avoidance of these disputes and other potentially harmful matters affecting U.S.-EU trade relations constitutes an unfulfilled priority of the NTA. Under the NTA, the United States
and EU committed themselves to full implementation of WTO
Uruguay Round commitments,75 a repudiated promise evidenced
by the number of disputes currently within, and likely moving
towards, the control of the dispute settlement mechanism. The
biannual summits among U.S. and EU political leaders produce
mixed results, often leading to no resolution, given the seemingly conclusive lesson that summitry works best when conflicts
reach a point where only high-level political involvement is necessary to avert a complete breakdown.7 ' Further, the successes
and failures of the summits, as well as high-level senior official
meetings, remain difficult to assess given the problems members of
of these
have in assessing the actual number
dffusdengagements
• 77
of diffused conflicts. In many respects, the efforts undertaken
since the inception of the NTA have primarily focused on fighting "fires," so to speak, rather than preventing them. These
"fires" essentially resulted from the existence of many contentious issues, such as beef hormones and banana policies, originating before the inception of NTA machinery such as the
EWM. 5 According to the TABD, the reason for continued U.S.EU trade discord hardly seems to be resulting from a shortage
of NTA institutions.79
(noting cases where the U.S. has been subject to adverse WTO rulings for protectionist trade practices); Press Release, European Union, EU Adopts Temporary Measures to Guard Against Flood of Steel Imports Resulting from U.S. Protectionism
(Mar. 27, 2002), at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/goods/steel /pr_270302
.htm.
74. See Occasional Squalls: A Ruling Against America Aggravates Trade Tensions, THE ECONOMIST, Jun. 30, 2001, at 83.
75. See NTA, supra note 10, at art. III (stating countries agree to "contribute to
the expansion of world trade by fully implementing our Uruguay Round commitments").
76. Guy de Jonquieres, How Can Transatlantic Trade Disputes be Avoided?,
FIN. TIMES, May 7, 2001, available at www.tabd.org/media/2001/050701ft.html ("The
lesson seems to be that summitry works best when conflicts are either ripe for settlement or have reached the point where only high-level political involvement can
avert complete breakdown.").
77. See id. (listing problems that high-level political officials and countries have
in finding agreement on how to solve trade conflicts).
78. Id.
79. See id. According to the TABD, the creation of new institutions will not
likely resolve these problems, nor will proposals like the Transatlantic Free Trade
Area or NTM serve as adequate solutions. In fact, the TABD argues the creation of
the NTM may worsen the situation, especially in the context of multilateral trade
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In many respects, U.S.-EU trade problems may be adequately attributed to the existing internal institutions of the two
sides. Foremost, divergent national regulations pose barriers to
U.S. and EU trade, externally and within. ° Various legitimate
reasons exist for these differences, namely the different problems facing the states, cultural variances in attitudes towards
risk, diverging political agendas, and the political difficulties involved in solving trade-related matters domestically."s Consequently, in the case of the EU, the merging of fifteen different
countries into one supra-national organization with a complex
and bifurcated trade law- and policy-making authority unavoidably yields conflict that spills over into the bilateral relations
with the United States.82 Given the internal intricacies of the interplay among EU legal institutions, such as the European
Council, the European Commission, the European Parliament,
and the European Court of Justice, coupled with the diverging
opinions and constituencies of the member states and their representatives, the actual construction of trade law and policy
constitutes an arduous and Herculean task. 3 Furthermore, the
lawmaking task at the EU institutional level constitutes only
relations and the WTO. See id.
80. See Sir Leon Brittain, TransatlanticEconomic Partnership:Breaking Down
the Hidden Barriers, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL
PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 17 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000)
(claiming that common regulatory standards or, alternatively, the acceptance of existing differences in standards and finding ways of reducing their trade effects, represent important options to solving problems in U.S.-EU economic relations).
81. See PETER HOLMES & ALASDAIR YOUNG, EMERGING CHALLENGES TO THE
EU'S EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 4-6 (Sussex European Institute, Working Paper No. 42, 2001).
82. From a general standpoint, the EU is composed of five different governing
bodies with overlapping functions and an intricate system of checks and balances.
For purposes of this article, the following descriptions will suffice: the European
Council fulfills the political and law-making role; the Commission serves an executive and civil service function and proposes legislation to the Council, though delegated the authority to pass legislation itself in certain areas; the Parliament acts as
an advisor and supervisor for the other institutions; the Court of Justice serves as
the supreme judicial authority on Community law issues; and the Court of Auditors
acts as the financial watchdog over all of the EU institutions. Internal and external
trade policies follow a complex path from the EU level through these institutions to
the individual state level where member states are expected to harmonize domestic
laws to conform to EU directives and initiatives. For a more thorough and sufficient
explanation of the EU legislative process, see WEATHERILL, supra note 3; GEORGE A.
BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW (2d ed. 2002).
83. See generally infra note 85 and accompanying text. The general lawmaking process and the interplay of the institutions of the EU lies beyond the scope
of this paper. For an excellent introduction to the law and institutions of the EU see
TOM KENNEDY, LEARNING EUROPEAN LAw (1998).
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half of the struggle, as such legislation must then be incorporated into the laws of each member state. 4 Harmonization
problems, as well as the ability of member states to introduce
more stringent standards under certain circumstances, contribute to trade-related problems within the European community
as well as in external relations with the United States. 5 As
these matters further complicate the nature of U.S.-EU trade
relations, the issue promises to grow increasingly more complicated with the reconstruction of the EU institutions under the
Treaty of Nice 6 and with the forthcoming enlargement of the
EU that hopes to add an additional ten member states, mainly
from Eastern Europe, by 2004.
Though the composition and structure of the EU plays a
complicating role in the problems related to transatlantic trade,
political and institutional complexities within the United States
contribute equally. Article I, section 8, clauses 1 and 3 of the
U.S. Constitution charge Congress with the responsibility to
"lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises" and "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several
states."8 In most cases, Congress has delegated the power to
negotiate with foreign governments to the U.S. President and
Executive Branch." Constitutional checks and balances insure
congressional involvement, by requiring the U.S. Senate to "consent" to treaties and international agreements by a two-thirds
majority vote. 9' While other means of implementing legislation
remain immune from congressional interference, such as the executive agreement that allows the President to make certain
agreements without ratification from the Senate, 91 the President
has other means of implementing legislation that are not en84. See generally WEATHERILL, supra note 3; see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
85.

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, arts. 95, 224, Feb. 7,

1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992).
86. TREATY OF NICE, PROTOCOL ON THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION, Feb. 26, 2001, O.J. (C 80) (2001) 1. See generally, e.g., Charles W. Smitherman III, GrowingPains: The Enlargement of the European Union and the European
Commission Under the Treaty of Nice, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 179 (2002).
87.
See TREATY OF NICE, PROTOCOL ON THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION, supra note 86; see also Press Release, The Laeken Declaration: The Future

of the European Union, Dec. 15, 2001, SN/273/01 ("The Union is about to expand to
bring in more than ten new Member States, predominantly Central and Eastern
European...").
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3.
89. See, e.g., infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
90. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
91. MICHAEL K. YOUNG, UNITED STATES TRADE LAW AND POLICY 33-35 (2001).
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tirely immune from congressional interference. For example,
the President can make executive agreements without the Senate's ratification. However, since executive agreements usually
require the enactment of subsequent legislation congressional
involvement cannot be avoided.92 The path from opening trade
negotiations to domestic effectuation of international law is
blocked with many political obstacles.9 3 The diverse political input and congressional involvement in U.S. trade policies result
in an underlying protectionist attitude. Consequently, trade arrangements only complicate trade relations, especially with the
EU.
Perhaps the most effective means of dealing with the complexities of the U.S. institutional system can be found in the
presidential trade promotion authority, commonly known as
Fast Track.9 4 Such authority essentially allows the President to
negotiate trade deals without congressional amendment, derived from congressional pre-authorization. 95 Fast Track creates
an environment where U.S. negotiating partners remain assured that the United States will not seek re-negotiation of
agreements; while increasing the interplay between the President and Congress throughout the negotiating process, allowing
for significant day-to-day input from Congress into the negotiations.96 The end result produces a substantial certainty that
Congress will approve and implement these international trade
agreements.97 Accordingly, virtually every Fast Track negotiated treaty receives congressional approval. 9 The Bush Administration resurrected this important measure, which had expired in 1994, through the Trade Act of 2002. 99
Institutional and political restraints on the legislative processes, in both the United States and the EU, hamper the ad92. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
93. See YOUNG, supra note 91, at 34-35 (noting some political compromises that
have developed between the U.S. Congress and the President with respect to treaty
creation and enactment).
94. Trade Act of 2002 §§ 2101-2113, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3813 (2002).
95. Id.
96. YOUNG, supra note 91, at 32-33 (finding that Fast Track authority creates
an environment in which the President can assure U.S. negotiating partners that
the United States will not seek renegotiation, while increasing consultations between Congress and the President).
97. Id. at 33.
98. Id. ("[V]irtually every trade agreement negotiated under Fast Track has
been approved, while many negotiated without such prior authorization and consultation have not.").
99. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3813.
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vancements made under the NTA. Trade disputes often find
their way to the WTO dispute settlement system, increasing the
growing tensions among U.S. and EU political leaders. The realization of the NTM, as envisioned in the NTA, may be the answer to these disputes. Nevertheless, in addition to these political and institutional impediments, numerous legal barriers
remain in place and at issue, maintaining hostility and conflict
within the U.S.-EU trade relationship.
II. LEGAL BARRIERS TO THE REALIZATION OF THE NEW
TRANSATLANTIC MARKETPLACE
The NTA's fulfillment of its visionary NTM faces substantial legal barriers as a result of the domestic laws of the EU and
United States. As evidenced by the various matters regarding
GATT/WTO commitments adjudicated by the United States and
EU before the WTO dispute settlement system,'0 0 numerous areas of conflicting trade law and regulation exist, which must be
dealt with before the NTM can take effect. Commonly referred
to as trade barriers, these objectionable practices broadly include laws, regulations, policies, and practices that either discriminately protect domestic companies and products from foreign competition or artificially stimulate the exportation of
certain domestic goods.' 01 Undeniably, the United States and
EU maintain trade barriers as part of their respective domestic
legal regimes. Representative of the legal challenges posed to
the NTM, the following section generally analyzes the trade barriers sustained by the EU and the United States.
A. EU BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT
Trade barriers pose both political and economic problems to
states affected by their subsistence. Charged by section 181 of
the Trade Act of 1974,1°2 the Office of the U.S. Trade Represen100. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
101. See generally 2002 USTR NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN
TRADE BARRIERS, available at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/2002 (listing foreign
barriers to trade) [hereinafter NTE]; ROBERT M. MACLEAN & BETTINA VOLPI, EU
TRADE BARRIER REGULATION: TACKLING UNFAIR FOREIGN TRADE PRACTICES (2000);
Ivo VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANCOIS BELLIS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: EEC ANTI-DUMPING AND OTHER TRADE PROTECTION
LAws (1985).
102. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-168, § 181, 88 Stat. 1976, 2041 (1971)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2002)).
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tative conducts an annual review of trade barriers and publishes
its conclusions in the National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE Report). 01 3 As one of several nations
discussed in the report, a special section is devoted to trade barriers maintained by the EU. 04 This section will examine the
eight areas specified in the NTE Report, specifically EU Import
Policies; Standards, Testing, Labeling and Certification; Government Procurement; Export Subsidies; Intellectual Property
Rights Protection; Services Barriers; and, Trade Restrictions Affecting E-Commerce.
1. EU Import Policies
The NTE Report finds various import policies maintained
by the EU to be acts constituting barriers to trade and therefore
objectionable. First, the EU retains restrictions that adversely
affect U.S. wine exports through regulations authorizing wines
only produced through specific wine-making procedures.'0 5
While U.S. wines are exempt from these restrictions through the
of the ilargest wine producing countries in
end of 2003, 106 as one of
the world, the United States stands to suffer significant financial loss if derogations are not extended.' 7 In addition to these
concerns, the United States raises objections to wine import certification practices instituted by the EU, as well as labeling requirements specifically relating to an EU attempt to phase out
the usage of semi-generic names (i.e. burgundy, champagne,
chablis) on non-EU wines and other "traditional expressions"
(primarily geographical indications) used to describe wine.' °8
A second example of an import policy barrier to trade maintained by the EU relates to market access restrictions on U.S.
Price, volume, and access controls
pharmaceutical products.'
maintained by individual states in the EU allegedly undermine
the EU's free movement of goods concept, impairing the ability
103. See NTE, supra note 101 (reviewing, country by country, foreign barriers to
trade around the world).
104. Id. at 106.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 19 U.S.C. § 2801 (2002) (stating congressional findings on the imbalance in
international wine trade resulting from tariff and non-tariff barriers posed against
U.S. exporters); see also Gideon Rachman, The Globe in a Glass: European Winemakers Believe in Tradition and Regulation, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1999, at 9192.
108. NTE, supra note 101, at 106.
109. Id. at 107.
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of U.S. pharmaceutical companies to set prices for their products, as well as recoup research and development costs."' The
United States contends that the state practices of Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, and the Netherlands serve anti-competitive
purposes and discriminate against U.S. pharmaceuticals."'
2. EU Standards,Testing, Labeling, and Certification
As discussed previously, the diverse and bifurcated makeup of the EU with its fifteen member states presents a persistent problem for nations attempting to trade with the EU. 112
Fifteen member states means fifteen different legal and regulatory regimes within the EU itself. Each member state serves
the function of harmonizing diverging laws with directives and
initiatives passed at the EU institutional level for consistency
and common policy, especially in the area of trade and commerce." 3 Identified as perhaps one of the most menacing barriers to trade by the United States, the differing standards, testing, and certification procedures maintained by EU member
states present problems in various industrial sectors. 1 4 The
United States feels this is an area of growing concern, citing issues such as the lack of transparency in regulatory procedures
and a deficiency in the opportunity for U.S. stakeholders to participate in critical parts of the process."'
The United States points to several examples relating to the
trade barriers posed in the general area of standards, testing,
labeling and certification.16 First, the process of developing EU
standards, inconsistent application and interpretation by the
member states of such standards, and the EU's reliance on performance based standards, as opposed to design-based stan110.
111.

Id. at 106.
Id. at 108-09.

112.

See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.

113. See generally WEATHERILL, supra note 3, at 150-73, 433-54.
114. See NTE, supra note 101, at 110 ("EU Member States still maintain widely
differing standards, testing, and certification procedures for some products. These
differences may serve as barriers to free movement of products within the EU, and
can cause lengthy delays in sales by U.S. exporters due to the need to have products
tested and certified to meet differing national requirements."). For specifics on these
varying standards see id. at 110-20.
115. Id. at 110 ("The United States has concerns that the European standardization and regulatory development processes lack adequate transparency and remain
generally closed to U.S. stakeholders' direct participation at critical points in the
regulatory development process.").
116. Id.
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dards, can serve to impede U.S. exports." 7 Second, problems
with mutual recognition agreements and procedures for the
granting of final approval for products causes difficulties for
U.S. companies, adding costs and limiting transparency in the
procedure.'18 In addition, issues related to biotechnology and
the EU's failure to approve any new genetically modified product since 1998, represent a significant problem for the U.S. agricultural sector, amounting to over $600 million in lost exports of
corn alone since the de facto ban began. 9 Regulations and bans
related to beef from cattle treated with growth hormones, poultry, transmissible spongiform enecephalopathies, and animal
by-products, likewise, remain problem areas cited in the NTE
Report. 2 ° Further, the United States points to several other issues in this general topic as causes for concern, including cosmetics and animal testing; chemicals; waste management; electrical and electronic equipment; acceleration of the phase-out of
ozone-depleting substances and greenhouse gases; triple superphosphate fertilizer; hushkitted or new engine modified and recertified aircraft; new aircraft certification; gas connector hose
"'
standards; roofing shingles; and, anchor bolts.12
Additionally, specific member state practices relating to
standards, testing, labeling, and certification remain a concern
to the United States. Specifically, French restrictions on the
importation of several U.S. products, including vitamin enriched
flour, bovine semen and embryos, and exotic meats, represent a
barrier to U.S. trade. 122 In addition, Italy's interpretation of EU
sanitary and phytosanitary requirements pose problems for
numerous U.S. agricultural exports, while seemingly
protecting
123
the Italian domestic market from U.S. competition.
3. EU Government Procurement
Government procurement constitutes an additional sector
where the United States accuses the EU of maintaining unfair
trade practices. The issue of discrimination in the utilities sector for private-firm bidding on government contracts appears
troubling, especially given the uncertainty following the exclu117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
NTE,
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

111. See also Smitherman, supra note 72.
supra note 101, at 112-14.
115-19.
120.
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sion of twelve EU member states from the telecommunication
provisions of the 1990 Utilities Directive,'24 which effectively required open, objective bidding procedures. 12' The NTE Report
also cites certain practices by member states with their own national government procurement procedures, including purported
biases in defense contracts for EU firms in Austria and Greece;
French and German biases against firms with relations to Scientology; and general problems with transparency
and fragmen26
tation in Italian procurement procedures. 1
4. EU Export Subsidies
Export subsidies represent another contentious issue between the United States and EU. The United States raises concerns over the legality of such subsidies under international
trade agreements.'
Such concerns focus particularly on the
Airbus Integrated Company, a partnership of the FrenchGerman-Spanish European Aeronautic, Defense, and Space
Company and the United Kingdom's BAE Systems ,
and the
continuation of EU government subsidies that seemingly facilitate Airbus' position in the worldwide market.'
The United
States alleges that these ongoing subsidies may violate the
130
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
and, accordingly, the United States requested the EU to verify
that WTO rules are being followed.'13 Other issues of contention
within the scope of export subsidies include Belgian and Swedish support for certain Airbus suppliers 2 and UK
subsidization
3
of Rolls-Royce development of aircraft engines.
124. Council Directive 90/531/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 297).
125. NTE, supra note 101, at 120-21.
126. Id. at 121-22.
127. Id.
128. See generally Case COMP/M.2061 - AIRBUS (Oct. 18, 2000), available at
http://europa.eu.int (declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common
market and providing background information on the merger leading to the creation
of Airbus).
129. See Richard 0. Cunningham, Subsidies to Large Civil Aircraft Production:
New WTO Subsidy Rules and Dispute Settlement Mechanism Alter Dynamics of
U.S. -E. U. Dispute, 14 AIR & SPACE L. 4 (1999).
130. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, available at www.wto.org/english

/docs_e/legal-e/legal-e.htm.
131. NTE, supra note 101, at 122-24.
132. Id. at 122-23.
133. Id. at 123-24.
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5. Intellectual Property Rights Protection
Although the EU and United States represent perhaps the
world's leading advocates for the protection of intellectual property rights, differences remain between the two concerning the
34
enforcement and implementation of international agreements.
The NTE Report raises concerns over member state implementation of EU Council directives and regulations relating to copyrights, designs, patents, and biotechnological inventions, some
of which do not adhere to TRIPS.'3 5 Specific issues raised include EU protection of geographical indication for wines, spirits,
and other agricultural products not available to the United
States or other WTO members on a national treatment basis,
varying forms of intellectual property piracy in Belgium,
France, Germany, and Italy that result in significant loses to
the U.S. motion picture industry, and a provision in Swedish
copyright law that denies the right of compensation to authors
and producers for private reproductions of their audiovisual
works. 36 Essentially, enforcement and consistency with international agreements remain the fundamental issues for the
United States when dealing with EU intellectual property rights
protection.
6. EU Services Barriers
EU barriers to trade in services remain an additional area
of concern for the United States. Specifically, U.S. anxiety
spurs from issues over the 1989 EU Broadcast Directive 137 that
requires a majority of television airtime to be reserved for programs of European origin. 38 For example, certain member
states, such as France and Italy, exceed the requirements of the
Broadcast Directive regarding television and radio programming, effectively limiting the broadcast share of U.S. programs
and music. 9 Also, the indexing of films found unsuitable to minors in Germany serves to harm the U.S. motion picture industry, adding additional costs and uncertainty to the distribution
134. See id. at 124.
135. Id. at 124-27.
136. Id. at 125-27.
137. Council Directive 89/552/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23-30, as amended by Directive Pursuit 97/36/EEC, 1997 O.J. (L 202) 60-71. The Directive was scheduled for
revision in 2002.
138. Id.
139. See NTE, supra note 101, at 127-28.
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process.
Furthermore, the United States accuses the EU of anticompetitive measures in numerous service sectors that impede the
access of U.S. companies and professionals to the European
market. One example is the prevalence of postal monopolies in
several EU states, which serves to restrict market access by
U.S. express and packaging services, subjecting them to unequal
conditions of competition.14 '
According to the NTE Report,
variations in EU member state requirements for professional
services, such as legal and accounting, also serve to complicate
market access, whereby licensing in one member state does not
necessarily entail the right to practice in another.14 2 Furthermore, problems remain in the area of market access for telecommunications, involving the provisioning and pricing of unbundled local loops, line sharing, co-location, and the
provisioning of leased lines. 143 Finally, lengthy and cumbersome
procedures in several states, including France, Italy, Austria,
and Portugal, hamper the enforcement of national legislation
involving competition in broadband services.'4
7. EU Investment Barriers
Under the 1993 Maastrict Treaty, 145 the EU is responsible
for the free movement of capital among the member states. 4 6
However, many member state practices continue to serve as
barriers to foreign investment. 14 7 For example, Greek regulations serve to disadvantage U.S. investors in several sectors due
to the discrepant treatment given to EU firms and the excessive48
red tape and contract delays that affect foreign investment.
Also, grandfather clause legislation in the United Kingdom subjects foreign banks to substantial registration requirements,
while allowing domestic firms to continue business without reapplying for permission or approval.' 49 In essence, the primary

140. Id.
141. Id. at 128-29.
142. Id. at 129-30.
143. Id. at 130-31.
144. Id. at 132-35.
145. See generally TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (MAASTRICT TREATY), Feb. 7,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992), available at www.hri.org/docsfMaastricht92.
146. See id.
147. NTE, supra note 101, at 135.
148. Id. at 136-37.
149. Id. at 137.
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contention is that practices of different states fail to treat an
outside firm uniformly, even through the firm has been recognized by one member state.
8. EU Trade RestrictionsAffecting Electronic Commerce
Electronic commerce represents an additional area specified
as a matter of concern under the NTE Report. Although the use
of e-commerce is not as widespread in Europe as in the United
States, considerable growth is expected over the next few
years."0 Initiatives, such as the 1995 Data Protection Directive'.. and an updated draft on data privacy, provide reason for
concern, especially as to the expanded coverage of the draft,
which institutes more stringent restrictions on unsolicited commercial mail, phone calls, and customer inclusion in directories. 52 In addition, a proposed EU directive that would apply
the Value Added Tax (VAT) to e-commerce goods, regardless of
whether the services supplied originate inside or outside the
EU, poses potentially discriminatory effects on U.S.-based busiIn effect, U.S. businesses would be forced to remit the
nesses.
VAT at fifteen different rates, depending on the customer's residence, while EU businesses would only be obligated to remit the
VAT at the rate of its registered member state."' Additional
concerns over this proposed directive stem from the enforcement
of more stringent administrative burdens on U.S. companies, including strict verification and data storage requirements."'
9. Other Barriers
In addition to the aforementioned legal trade barriers maintained by the EU, the NTE Report also discusses the long-6
standing EU support program for the canned peach industry."
Subsidization in Greece of the industry resulted in significant
U.S. domestic loses. 157 Following a successful GATT panel decision for the United States,"' the EU and United States reached
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 137-39.
Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
NTE, supra note 101, at 138-39.
See Council Directive 2001/115/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 15) 24.
NTE, supra note 101, at 139.
Id.
Id.
Id.
European Economic Community - Production Aids Granted on Canned
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an agreement on processing subsidies.' 59 However, recent EU
legislation instituting a new regime prompted U.S. concern over
the changed procedures for establishing aid levels for canned
fruit. 6 ° Consultations on this matter remain ongoing.16
B. U.S. BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT
Similar to the U.S. Trade Representative's report on trade
barriers maintained by the EU, the European Commission publishes a yearly report outlining contentious trade practices sustained under U.S. law. 162 Compiled by the Market Access Unit
of the Directive General for Trade and the Delegation of the
European Commission in Washington, D.C., the Commission
Report claims that "a considerable number of impediments" remain in effect in the United States that "need to be tackled." 6 3
Though structurally different than the NTE Report, the Commission Report reviews U.S. trade barriers in six different categories, namely: Extraterritoriality and Unilateralism; Tariff
Barriers; Non-Tariff Barriers; Investment Related Measures;
Intellectual Property Rights; and, Services. The following sections generally analyze these areas to further provide a backdrop for the problems facing the realization of the NTM.

1. U.S. Extraterritorialityand Unilateralism
The EU expresses particular concern, as a matter of law
and principle, with U.S. extraterritorial legislation that attempts to regulate EU trade with third countries.6 6 Foreign
persons and companies, particularly business organizations operating out of the EU, are forced to comply with U.S. laws outside of the United States, most of which only serve U.S. trade
and political interests.' 6' An example of such legislation is the

Peaches, Canned Pears, Canned Fruit Cocktail and Dried Grapes, L/5778, available
at 1985 GATTPD LEXIS 2 (Feb. 20, 1985) (unadopted).
159. See id.
160. See NTE Report, supra note 101, at 139.
161. Id. at 140.
162. Commission Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Investment
2001, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/pdf/usrbt200l.pdf [hereinafter
Commission Report].
163. Id. at 3.
164. Id. at 7.
165. Id.
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Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996166
(LIBERTAD). LIBERTAD enables U.S. citizens to file suit
against foreign companies investing in Cuba,167 while requiring
the United States to deny executives and shareholders of these
companies entry into the country. 168 Under LIBERTAD, an EU
company found to be conducting trade with Cuba would, in theory, be subject to legal action in the United States. 169 Although
Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush waived and continue to waive Title IV application, the EU maintains that
LIBERTAD remains contrary to WTO agreements under GATT
and General Agreement on Trade and Services.170 Additional
examples of U.S. extraterritorial legislation include the Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996,171 which provides for mandatory
sanctions on foreign companies that invest over $40 million that
directly contributes or significantly aids in the development of
petroleum or natural gas in Iran or Libya'72 and the Iran NonProliferation Act of 200,'73 which provides for discretionary
sanctions against foreign companies exporting goods, services,
and technology to Iran prohibited under U.S. export control
regulations and international export regimes that may potentially contribute to the development of weapons of mass destruction. 174 In essence, these extraterritorial U.S. laws attempt to
dictate the laws and policies of other countries, including the
EU, by applying sanctions to matters under the authority of EU
export
controls. Such legislation remains objectionable to the
175
EU.
In addition to extraterritorial legislation, the EU objects to
United States use of unilateral trade sanctions and/or retaliatory measures against "offending" states or companies. 176 Examples of such legislation include the use of Sections 301 of the

166. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) [hereinafter LIBERTAD].
167. Id. tit. III.
168. Id. tit. IV.
169. See id.
170. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annex 1B,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M.

1125, 1177 (1994).
171. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (2000).
172. Id. § 5.
173. Iran Non-proliferation Act of 2000, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (2000).
174. Id. §§ 2-3(b).
175. See Commission Report, supra note 162, at 8-9.
176. See id. at 9.
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Trade Act of 197417 and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988178 (Omnibus Act), under which the U.S. government is authorized to enforce rights afforded to the United
States through international trade agreements. 179 Furthermore,
this legislation allows the United States to retaliate against foreign governments that maintain practices the United States
180
deems as discriminatory or unjustifiable restrictions on trade.
Standing on the receiving end of several U.S. actions under Section 301, the EU remains particularly sensitive to this matter."
Additionally, the "Super 301" provision of the Omnibus Act
mandates the establishment of a watch-list of "priority" unfair
trade practices from "priority" countries and, through the Executive Order on Identification of Trade Expansion Priorities,
orders the U.S. Trade Representative to self-initiate Section 301
actions against such countries." 2 Given the power possessed
under these statutes and the pending negative effects on trade,
the EU strongly opposes such U.S. unilateral and extraterritorial policies, claiming that through these acts, "trading partners
are given no choice but to negotiate on the basis of an agenda
set by the U.S., on the basis of judgments [sic], perceptions,
timetables, and indeed, U.S. legislation."8 3
2. U.S. Tariff Barriers
While the GATT/WTO Uruguay Round propelled tariff reduction and elimination, the EU points to several "peaks" maintained by the United States in certain sectors that serve as barriers to free trade.'
Such applied tariff barriers include the
U.S. refusal to expand the scope of the Information Technology
Agreement, 18 5 which serves to eliminate all tariffs on semiconductors, computers, and various other electronic components, to
cover other products such as optical fibers.'
Likewise, the
177. Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000).
178. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1301, Pub. L. No. 100418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1998).
179. See Trade Act of 1974 § 301.
180. Id.
181. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1301; Exec. Order
No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779, reprintedas amended in 19 U.S.C. § 2901 note (2000).
182. Commission Report, supra note 162, at 9.
183. Id. at 11.
184. Id.
185. Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products, supra note 54.
186. Commission Report, supra note 162, at 11.
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United States rejected an EU offer to abolish tariffs in the ceramics and glass sectors where tariffs remain high in the United
States, and the United States remains averse to lowering tariff
levels on products such as textiles, leather, jewelry, and automobiles. 87 In addition to applied tariff barriers, the EU cites
U.S. maintenance of tariff quotas as an added barrier to trade,
specifically seen in built-in rigidities, and fragmentation in the
import licensing system for dairy products, which is adversely
affecting European cheeses.'
3. U.S. Non-Tariff Barriers
Broadly encompassing several important issues constituting
barriers to trade sustained by the United States, non-tariff barriers represent perhaps the most contentious issue in U.S.-EU
trade relations. Included under the umbrella of non-tariff barriers is the subject of registration, documentation, and customs
procedures. Within this area, the EU asserts that U.S. invoice
requirements on certain EU imports remain excessive and surpass normal customs declaration and tariff procedures. 89 Additionally, the United States does not recognize the European
Community as a country of origin, thus European Community
certificates of origin are unacceptable and EU companies must
furnish additional documentation and undergo further procedures for certification, costing additional time and money.190
Moreover, U.S. law prohibits EU fishermen from fishing in U.S.
waters based on a provision that forbids foreign-built U.S. flag
vessels from being documented with a fishery endorsement,19 '
and under vessel ownership requirements that mandate U.S.
citizen ownership of such vessels to be seventy-five percent, in
order to receive fishery endorsement. 192 Further, U.S. environmental efforts to protect sea-faring mammals and fish seemingly place restrictive burdens on foreign companies engaged in
the fishing business.9
Such impediments arise through requirements on the types of nets that may be used in U.S. waters, which the EU opposes because of the manner in which the
187. Id. at 12.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 13.
190. Id.
191. 46 U.S.C. § 12108 (2001); Commission Report, supra note 162, at 14.
192. The American Fisheries Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. C, tit. II, Oct.
21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681-616; Commission Report, supra note 162, at 14.
193. Commission Report, supra note 162, at 14-15.
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restrictions were imposed. 9 4
Additional non-tariff barriers that the EU finds objectionable relate to U.S. state-level impediments to trade. These problems are inherent in the U.S. federal system of governance that
distributes certain powers to state and local governments. For
example, the maintenance of so-called "blue" laws by states
support protectionist and monopolistic systems at the state level
by limiting the circulation of alcohol products, including wine,
beer,'95 and liquor through arbitrary standards such as alcohol
content limits. 96 In addition, U.S. states maintain a series of
user fees, where fees are imposed on the arrival of merchandise,
vessels, trucks, trains, private boats and planes, and passengers.' 97 These fees also apply to customs, harbor, and other arrival facilities, mainly run by importers, which put foreign products at a disadvantage compared with U.S. products, which are
not subject to such fees. 9 ' Harbor maintenance taxes and service fees also place unfair burdens on EU companies."'
The EU also contends various standards and technical requirements serve as barriers to trade with the United States. °°
Issues ranging from the over-complexities of the U.S. regulatory
regime to the non-use of international standards for certain
products present what the EU calls technical barriers to trade
impeding market access. 20 ' Examples include an excessive reliance by the United States on mandatory certification, varying
regulatory differences at the federal and state level, and issues
surrounding non-destructive testing.202 Additional technical
barriers to trade with regard to electrical and electronic equipment permeate where no single market exists, due to diverging
regulatory schemes from the federal level all the way down to

194. See WTO Dispute Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia,
WT/DS58/RW (Jun. 15, 2001), 41 I.L.M. 149 (2002), available at www.wto.org;
Commission Report, supra note 162, at 17-18.
195. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 3-1-2(13) (2001) (defining legal malt beverages/beer as those with alcohol contents of less than six percent).
196. See, e.g., Charles W. Smitherman, Drunken Ignorance:The GeorgiaGeneral
Assembly's Refusal to Redefine Beer Alcohol Content Legislation From an Economic
Perspective, 8 GA. LEAGUE REP. 23 (2002).
197. Commission Report, supra note 162, at 14-15.
198. Id.
199. Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States HarbourMaintenance Tax, supra note 68.
200. Commission Report, supra note 162, at 18-26.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 19-20.
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city and county regulations, as well as issues in the areas of
telecommunication equipment, automobiles, pharmaceuticals
and cosmetics, textiles and leather, and agriculture and fishing.
Government procurement presents another non-tariff barrier subject to EU objections. Specifically, federal "Buy American" legislation under the 1933 Buy American Act 20 4 adversely
affects foreign trade by prohibiting public sector bodies from
purchasing certain goods and services from foreign sources, by
establishing local content requirements, and through the extension of preferential price terms to certain domestic suppliers.0 5
In addition, procurements under the "national security" exception broadly apply across the board to prevent foreign involvement in defense contracts and the management and operation of
certain government supported facilities, such as NASA and the
National Science Foundation." 6 Further, the EU contends subfederal procurements adversely affect trade through sub-federal
selective purchasing laws, state "Buy American" legislation and
restrictions, and "set-aside for small businesses" programs.2 0 7
In addition to government procurement issues, the EU
raises concerns over U.S. trade defense instruments. For example, the 1916 Anti-Dumping Act,2 °8 which prohibited the import
and sale of products "at a price substantially less than the actual market value in the principal markets of the country of
their production," received a negative ruling by a WTO Dispute
Panel in 2000,209 and still remains a subject of controversy. In
addition, the United States maintains certain safeguard measures for products, such as steel wire rod and welded line pipe,
through tariff quotas and import duties, adversely affecting
trade and EU companies in these sectors. 2 0 Further complications in this area arise from U.S. policies, such as the Byrd

203. Id. at 21-26.
204. Buy American Act of 1933, ch. 212, tit. III, § 2, 41 U.S.C. § 10a (2002). See
generally Ronald A. Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the
United States and European Union, 17 NW. J. INT'L & Bus. 556 (1996-97).
205. See generally Brand, supra note 204; Commission Report, supra note 162,
at 26-27.
206. Commission Report, supra note 162, at 27.
207. Id. at 28-30.
208. Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. §72 (1976).
209. WTO Dispute Panel Report, U.S.-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS162/R
(May 29, 2000), 39 I.L.M. 1402 (2000), available at www.wto.org and 2000 WTO DS
LEXIS 17.
210. Commission Report, supra note 162, at 33-34.
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Amendment,2 11 that provide remedies inconsistent with
WTO/GATT policies to certain domestic industries by: (1) obligating U.S. Customs to give the anti-dumping duty collected on
imports to the complaining industry; (2) establishing sunset reviews on countervailing duties; (3) setting countervailing duties
on pasta from Italy; and, (4) subsidizing domestic iron, steel,
and non-ferrous metal sectors.212
Furthermore, non-tariff barriers proliferate the area of U.S.
export restrictions. The EU cites requirements on EU companies to comply with U.S. re-export controls, including compliance with U.S. prohibitions on re-exports for national security
and foreign policy reasons, as an example of such non-trade
friendly practices maintained by the United States.212 Other examples include export controls on satellites and encryption
products, which limit cross-border movement of such products,
adversely affect trade, and may potentially be detrimental to
developing sectors such as e-commerce.2 14
The final issue addressed as a non-tariff barrier encompasses the use of the U.S. government subsidies for certain industrial sectors. Such sectors include aircraft, where the United
States provides support through government financing, as well
as via high-level political leverage, referred to by the EU as "inducement."2 15 Shipbuilding constitutes another area where U.S.
government subsidies remain at work, encompassing various
schemes by which governmental assistance is provided for the
industry through loan programs and protectionist requirements
that benefit U.S. manufacturing of ships in coastwise traffic.216
Also, U.S. agricultural and fishery subsidies remain a disconcerting issue for the EU, whereby the U.S. government provides
cash subsidies to enhance U.S. competitiveness with exports
from other countries. 217 In these areas the government provides
guaranteed loans, which afford certain advantages to participants, especially in terms of default, and may be viewed as providing unfair advantages to U.S. producers.218

211. Byrd Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-201, 103 Stat. 701 (amended 1989).
212. Commission Report, supra note 162, at 34-35.
213. Id. at 35.
214. Id. at 35-37; see YOUNG, supra note 91, at 123.
215. Commission Report, supra note 162, at 37-38.
216. Id. at 38-39. See Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (2002); Merchant Marine Act,
tit. IX, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1185 (2002).
217. Commission Report, supra note 162, at 39.
218. Id. at 39.
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4. U.S. Investment Related Measures
The EU's complaints over U.S. investment related measures
will serve as a significant obstacle in the realization of the NTM,
especially since investment-related measures are a financially
significant section of the U.S.-EU trade relationship. One area
of EU criticism arises out of U.S. limitations on foreign direct
investment. 219 Under the Exxon-Florio amendment to the 1988
Trade Act,2 1 the U.S. President is authorized to review the effects on U.S. national security arising from any merger, acquisition, or take-over that could result in foreign control and suspend or prohibit such transactions that threaten national
security. 22' The EU contends such measures inhibit the free
flow of investment and may conflict with the OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements 222 and the National Treatment
Instrument.222 Further issues of contention arise over U.S. restrictions on foreign ownership, based on national security,
such as limitations in the areas of fishery endorsement 225 and
the operation or maintenance of facilities used in relation to
utilities. 226 The practice of Conditional National Treatment exists in the United States, which affords foreign firms less favorable treatment than domestic firms. The domestic firms gain
their advantage through reciprocity requirements mandating
that U.S. firms be allowed to conduct activities in other states in
order for companies from those states to conduct similar activities in the United States, through performance requirements,
and through public subsidies.22 7
In addition, the EU cites tax discrimination as a barrier to
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. Id. at 213.
222. OECD Code of Liberalizationof CapitalMovements and of CurrentInvisible
Operations,at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00007000/MO0007320.pdf (last visited Feb.
13, 2003).
223. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., THE OECD DECLARATION ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: BASIC TEXT,
DAFFEAIME (2000) 20, at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/c5ce8ffa418
35d64c125685d005300b0/c125692700623b74c1256991003b5147/$FILE/00085743.PD
F (last visited Jan. 8, 2003) [hereinafter NATIONAL TREATMENT INSTRUMENT]. For
general information on the National Treatment Instrument, see The National
Treatment Instruments, at http://www.oecd.orgIEN/document/0,Eno-nodirectorateno-6 (last visited Jan. 8, 2003).
224. See Commission Report, supra note 162, at 39.
225. See 46 U.S.C. § 688.
226. Commission Report, supra note 162, at 40-41.
227. Id. at 41.
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investment maintained under U.S. law. In support of its argument, the EU cites issues such as additional reporting requirements imposed on foreign firms, "earnings stripping" provisions
that limit tax deductions on payments made to parties not subject to U.S. taxes, and issues surrounding state and world-wide
unitary taxation as examples of discriminating U.S. policies that
adversely affect European businesses.2 " The Foreign Sales Corporation tax issue129 represents another problematic area. The
WTO recently ruled against this legislation and whether the
United States will fully comply still remains uncertain.2 °
5. IntellectualProperty Rights
Even through no mention of trade barriers to Intellectual
Property (IP) is mentioned in the Commission Report, the EU
accuses the U.S. of maintaining barriers to trade in the area of
IP rights. EU complaints include issues with the "home-style
exemption" under the 1976 U.S. Copyright Act,1 1 whereby radios and televisions may be played in public places without the
payment of a royalty fee to the copyright owner, a matter the
EU alleges causes "serious deprivation of income to EU rightsholders."23 2 Conflicting U.S.-EU positions over the origin and
geographical labeling of wines and spirits, coupled with conflicts
over grape names, present an additional area of concern.2 3 Further, the EU disputes U.S. regulations related to patents and
trademarks.234 Specifically, the EU disputes measures that allow for the instant removal or exclusion of imported goods that
infringe on U.S. intellectual property rights. 235 Additionally, the
EU disapproves of U.S. laws that allow for the government to
infringe on patent rights without repercussion.
The EU also
228. Id. at 42.
229. Id. at 43 (stating that the U.S. purports to provide tax exemptions for income earned by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations).
230. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign
Sales Corporations,"WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000), 39 I.L.M. 717 (2000), (asserting that U.S. foreign sales corporation tax rules constitute a prohibited export subsidy).
231. Commission Report, supra note 162, at 43 (referring to Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002)).
232. Id. at 44.
233. Id. at 45-46.
234. Id. at 46.
235. Id.
236. Id. (referring to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498, which designates the proper jurisdiction and venue for patent and copyright cases).
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notes problems with the exclusive U.S. patent "first to file" system that, as the name denotes, grants patents to the party that
files first; extraterritorial issues prohibiting the registration or
renewal of trademarks identical or similar to trademarks previously owned by a confiscated Cuban entity;... and, the patentability of software and business methods allowed for in the
United States.
6. U.S. Barriersto Services
The final area of U.S. trade barriers addressed in the Commission Report, are those dealing with services, which is another financially important sector in the U.S.-EU trade relationship. The EU claims the regulation and licensing of certain
professions at the state level, and lack of transparency in the
regulation of foreign business services, remain unacceptable.23 9
In addition, EU firms in the communications service sector face
certain barriers, especially for mobile and satellite services,
where investment restrictions, lack of access to certain frequencies, and de facto reciprocity-based procedures inhibit EU firms
from adequately competing in the U.S. 24 ° Furthermore, foreign
companies face barriers with respect to the attainment of telecommunications licenses, including limits on the ability of government-owned companies to invest in telecommunications
companies.2 4'
As for financial services, the EU cites problems in the U.S.
insurance sector, alleging challenges are posed by fragmentation
of different federal and state regulatory regimes and deficiencies
in the U.S. regulatory/supervisory structure, both of which burden EU companies with heavy compliance costs. 24 2 Also, complexities in U.S. securities laws make registration difficult for
foreign companies, while U.S. limitations on access to the trading screens of EU exchanges poses a growing problem.2 3 Finally, in the transport services sector, the EU asserts complaints ranging from U.S. limitations on foreign ownership of
U.S. air carriers to restrictions on the use of foreign-built vessels
237. Commission Report, supra note 162, at 47 (referring to Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 § 211, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (2002)).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 48.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 48-51.
242. Id. at 54.
243. Commission Report, supra note 162, at 55.
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in U.S. coastwise trade.244 In essence, the EU's complaints over
U.S. barriers to services emanate from problems inherent in
dealing with the multi-tiered regulatory schemes on the federal,
state, and sometimes municipal-level, as well as U.S. policies
aimed at protecting strategically important industries, such as
transportation and telecommunications.
III. THE REALIZATION OF THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC
MARKETPLACE
A. RATIONALE
Since 1990 and the institution of the Transatlantic
Agenda, 245 the organization of U.S.-EU trade relations and cooperation have evolved through various conciliation mechanisms,
including summits, miscellaneous cabinet-meetings, ordinary
diplomatic channels, and transatlantic dialogues. The growing
importance of the relationship and deepening of economic ties
brought forth conflicting calls for passive and aggressive economic integration,2 46 seemingly resulting in a compromise position between the EU and United States. This willingness to
compromise has progressively eliminated transatlantic trade
barriers discussed in the previous section, and has given to the
institutional framework of the NTM.24 Evident from the NTA's
obscure description of the NTM245 and the vague promise that
the EU and United States will work towards such a framework,
the NTM remains a developing concept with little legal development since the NTM's formal inception in 1995.249

The NTA made undeniable progress, through the lowering
of tariff and non-tariff barriers, since taking effect. 250 However,
the NTE Report on Foreign Trade Barriers in the EU, coupled
with the Commission's Report, demonstrate that significant obstacles remain in the U.S.-EU trade relationship, hurdles that
may, in fact, be overcome through deeper transatlantic economic
244. Id. at 55-57.
245. Transatlantic Declaration on EC-U.S. Relations, supra note 7.
246. See generally NTA, supra note 10; see also notes 11-19 and accompanying
text.
247. See generally NTA, supra note 10, at art. II; see also notes 100-241 and accompanying text.
248. See generally NTA, supra note 10.
249. Id.
250. See generally Commission Communication, supra note 53.
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integration instituted by the NTM.251 Tariff and non-tariff barriers, hidden impediments, and ongoing international trade disputes seemingly result from the lack of regulatory harmonization between the United States and EU, hindering economic
advancement while increasing costs to U.S. and EU businesses
and consumers.252 Accordingly, deeper transatlantic integration
could serve as a means of preventing disparities from arising in
the legal and regulatory frameworks, resolving outstanding bilateral trade disputes, and of ratcheting regional liberalization
towards multilateral liberalization by joining the world's two
most important trade regimes. This benefit could be extended
to outside countries and serve as a basis for development in the
GATT/WTO system.253
In pursuit of this realization, the European Commission established a set of nine criteria that need to be addressed in order to effectuate the NTM. 254 These requirements include that
the NTM should:
1. address the real barriers to EU-U.S. trade and
investment;
2. bring economic benefit to the EU and the United States
commensurate with the effort involved;
3. not damage and should indeed promote our objectives in
the future multilateral negotiations within the WTO, to
which we are committed;
4. not lead to the creation of new trade obstacles to third
countries or reduce their access to EU and U.S. markets.
Nor should it weaken their support for multilateral liberalization;
5. be ambitious and capture political interest, but be technically achievable;
6. be consistent with and should not jeopardize the agreed
multilateral rules of the WTO and other international
flora (e.g. OECD, WIPO, etc.);
7. serve to enhance the broader political relationship between the EU and the United States;
8. benefit consumers and should preserve a high level of

251. See supra Part II.
252. See supra Part II; see generally European Union Prepatory Acts: The European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee: The New Transatlantic
Marketplace: Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(98)0125
final [hereinafter Draft Communication].
253. Steinberg, supra note 17, at 244-47.
254. See Draft Communication, supra note 252.
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protection for health, safety, consumers, and the environment; and
9. not impede the further development of the Community
255
aquis.
Within these parameters, the European Commission calls for a
comprehensive and aggressive approach to making the NTM a
reality and for a NTM Agreement, aimed at achieving the following objectives:
1. the widespread removal of technical barriers to trade in
goods through an extensive process of mutual recognition and/or harmonization, promoting both consumer
and business interests;
2. a political commitment to eliminate by 2010 all industrial tariffs on a Most Favored Nation basis through
multilateral negotiations, provided that a critical mass of
other trading partners do the same;
3. a free trade area in services, bearing in mind the criteria
and requirements established by the Council;
4. liberalization beyond multilateral or plurilateral agreements in the areas of government procurement, intellectual property, and investment.

256

Accordingly, the realization of the NTM would likely result in
positive macro-economic benefits for both the United States and
EU. The European Commission claims that the removal of existing tariff and non-tariff barriers could add 125 billion euros to
the EU's annual national income and add another 25 billion euros through the elimination of industrial tariffs.2 ' From a micro-economic perspective, the NTM would mean greater economies of scale for the EU and United States, reduced costs for
businesses and consumers, and less uncertainty for EU and U.S.
firms.2

8

B. COMPONENTS OF THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC MARKETPLACE

An aggressive and expansive NTM will attempt to resolve
the various contentious areas that the United States and EU
find objectionable in their counterparts legal regimes. The components of the NTM may include eliminating technical trade
barriers for goods; tariff elimination; freedom of services; gov255.

Id.

256. Id.
257.

Id.

258.

See id.
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ernment procurement; and, various other possibilities.25 9 In order to adequately construct the contents of the NTM concept,
the following section briefly analyzes each of these areas.
1. EliminatingTechnical Trade Barriersfor Goods
Underlying many of the concerns expressed by the United
States and EU in their respective NTE and Commission Reports, technical barriers represent a major impediment to free
trade and competition in the transatlantic community. 260 Technical barriers take the form of information and labeling of goods,
technical specifications and performance requirements, testing
procedures that goods must comply with, requirements for declarations or certificates to accompany goods, accreditation of
bodies authorized to certify goods, and the marking of goods to
validate their conformity with certain requirements.261 Accordingly, the NTM would attempt to ensure public confidence in
product safety and security through "a framework for convergence of law, procedure and practice involving the various legislative and regulatory bodies."262 Such a framework would also
expand agreements such as the Mutual Recognition Agreement 263 to cover other areas and products, essentially aiming to
create a market system whereby the approval of a product for
use on one side of the Atlantic can, as far as possible, be marketed on the other side without facing further formalities or duplicate requirements.26 4
Convergence of law, procedure, and practice remain paramount to the removal of technical barriers to trade through mutual recognition. Through regulatory cooperation and harmonization, such an objective can be achieved, though diverging U.S.
and EU principles over health, environmental, and safety concerns pose the greatest obstacle, especially in the developing
area of biotechnology.6 5 In any event, the United States and EU
must agree on the sectors and products that will fall within the
ambit of mutual recognition liberalization and, at the very least,
the agreements should be made through the NTM to prevent
unnecessary or duplicative regulatory burdens maintained by
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.
See supra Part II and note 215.
See supra Part II; see also Draft Communication, supra note 252.
Draft Communication, supra note 252.
MRA, supra note 48.
See Draft Communication, supranote 252.
Id.
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both trading partners.
2. TariffElimination
Tariffs, which permeate the trade laws of both the United
States and EU and consequently impede free trade, are another
concern. Building on the common approach of WTO members
who voluntarily reduce tariffs on a Most Favored Nation (MFN)
basis in hopes of leading other states to do the same, the NTM
would likewise
work towards
iffsby naMF
210
" "266 an elimination of all industrial tariffs by 2010 on a MFN basis.
Through an agreement dictating
the number of members allowed in addition to the United States
and EU, the NTM could foster a zero tariff policy and entice
other states to benefit from tariff elimination by reciprocally
dissolving their own tariffs on industrial goods.267
However, industrial tariff elimination in the NTM may be
limited in scope. Areas with high levels of specificity and sensitivity, such as fish and fish-related products, must be addressed
through more complex procedures.
Agriculture presents another contentious issue that the NTM will find difficult to address, especially given the discrepancies in the fundamental
structures of EU and U.S. agricultural sectors. Without harmonization, free trade in agriculture may not be possible.265

266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., id. at 39; see also supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
269. For example, the EU continues to lead the world in the use of agricultural
export subsidies. The EU's reliance on these subsidies stems from its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which supports producer prices at levels that are generally
above world prices (prices prevailing in other markets). In order to export commodities to other markets, the EU must sell them at the prices prevailing in importing
markets, meaning the EU must subsidize the exports to compensate for the difference between the EU price and the world market price. See generally INTL' INFO.
PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, USTR ZOELLICK SUPPORTS AGGRESSIVE STANCE ON
AGRICULTURE TRADE, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topicallecon/wto/O2072201.htm (July
22, 2002) [hereinafter NTE Supports]. However, recent legislation in the United
States, specifically the Farm Bill of 2002, will raise U.S. subsidies for domestic
farmers by upwards of seventy percent, a matter the United States contends is still
less distorting than EU practices. See EMBASSY OF THE U.S., FACT SHEET: U.S.
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER 2002 FARM BILL, POLICIES LESS TRADE
DISTORTING THAN THOSE OF EU, JAPAN, at http://www.usa.or.th/news/press
/2002/nrot066.htm (June 25, 2002).
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3. Freedom of Services
The elimination of all restrictions covering the establishment of service sectors in areas such as telecommunications, financial services, business and professional services, and transport, remains a lofty and ambitious goal for the NTM.
Accordingly, based on General Agreement on Trade and Services27 ° schedules, the NTM would seek to: (1) liberalize market
access on the basis of host country control, thus, eliminating all
market access restrictions and (2) eliminate all regulatory obstacles through the mutual recognition of qualifications, regulations, and other requirements.2 7 ' Benefits would include, among
others, greater public procurement possibilities, greater certainty of market access, and the elimination of nationality and
non-transparent licensing procedures.272
The primary problems preventing the realization of such
goals lie inherently within the governmental and institutional
structures of the United States and EU. Specifically, the bifurcated federal-state-municipal system of the United States, as
well as the fact that the EU is a composite of fifteen unique sovereign states with the inherent problem of harmonizing the laws
of the member states, make the freedom of services objective of
the NTM a formidable goal indeed. However, a strong commitment to the freedom of services that transcends the multilayered system of governance in the United States and EU will
make this objective attainable.
4. Government Procurement
Government procurement represents an additional area of
dispute between the United States and EU that may adequately
be addressed in the NTM through the extension of full national
treatment between the parties.272 The United States and EU
may encounter some difficulties, however, in extending market
access beyond what is currently required in the Government
Procurement Agreement. 274 Namely, the EU must "commit to an
exchange of national treatment and a guarantee of fair and

270. Supra note 170 and accompanying text.
271. NTE Supports, supra note 269.
272. See generally id.
273. See id.
274. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 12, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D.
(26th Supp.) 33 (1980).
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transparent treatment of all suppliers and service providers
from both parties;" while the United States must remove all
"Buy American" preferences for the benefit of EU goods and extend exemptions and national treatment for small businesses to
EU firms.275 Specifically, the NTM will need to address: (1) the
elimination of national treatment exceptions covered under the
Agreement on Government Procurement 276 and the U.S.European Community agreement of 1995; (2) complete geographic and entity coverage; and, (3) the elimination of existing
sanctions.277
5. Other Possible Components of the New Transatlantic
Marketplace
As evidenced by the numerous complaints lodged within the
trade barrier reports published by the EU and United States,
additional sectors may be addressed and related problems resolved under the NTM framework. First, intellectual property
and the varying systems for registration, such as the U.S. approach to patent registration through its exclusive use of the
"first to file," as opposed to the EU's "first to invent" system,
present an opportunity for harmonization under the NTM.278
Also, the NTM could serve to foster and address investment contentions between the United States and EU, specifically urging
the development of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment
that would cover market access and protection of goods, services, and financial assets. 279 The NTM may also address labor
issues aimed at fully implementing the existing International
Labour Organization conventions; 28° business enterprise development through improvements in the business environment risk
capital access; entrepreneurship enhancement, innovation, and
training; e-commerce issues through trade and service liberalization; mutual recognition of standards and harmonization of
laws; data protection on the global information network scale;
competition policy with an aim to distinguish anti-trust and
state-aid; and taxation issues in regard to unfair treatment of

275. Draft Communication, supra note 252.
276. Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 274.
277. Draft Communication, supra note 252.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See, e.g., Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise
Convention (ILO No. 87), 68 U.N.T.S. 17, entered into force July 4, 1950.
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income tax exemptions and taxes on e-commerce.28
In essence, the NTM represents an ambitious and aggressive move toward transatlantic economic integration and trade
liberalization. Envisioned as the next step in U.S.-EU trade relations under the NTA in 1995, the NTM concept seeks to provide a forum for the two trading partners to tackle the numerous trade barriers presently maintained within their respective
legal and political regimes.2 2 In theory, economic benefits will
be derived from the NTM, increasing market competition and,
thus, generating savings for consumers and businesses on both
sides of the Atlantic. However, innovative ideas always encounter the imminent questions of viability and implications, and the
NTM is no exception, especially given the amount of work inherently involved and the level of support that will be necessary
for its realization.
IV. THE VIABILITY OF THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC
MARKETPLACE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON WORLD
TRADE
The NTA encompasses many areas in which the United
States and EU continue to work together, but its greater importance lies in its promise, in its potential, and in what it is capable of becoming."' Indeed, the most forward-looking component
of the NTA, with the capacity to dramatically redefine U.S.-EU
trade relations, arises in the NTM concept. While in theory the
NTM's call for eliminating all tariff and non-tariff barriers
seems somewhat realistic and attainable, the actualization of
such an objective will be much more problematic and complicated. The following section analyzes the viability of the consummation of the NTM, accounting for political and economic
concerns, as well as the possible conflict the NTM may pose to
the world's multilateral trading system.
From a logistical standpoint, the time frame for implementing a completed NTM remains a subject of much debate. Many
supporters of the NTM call for integration in stages, step-bystep over time, with no defined establishment of the free trade

281. Draft Communication, supra note 252.
282. See generally supra Part II.
283. See generally Earl Anthony Wayne, The Potentialof the New Transatlantic
Partnership:An American Perspective, in THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA AND
THE FUTURE OF EU-U.S. RELATIONS 3 (Jdrg Monar ed., 1998).
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area from the onset.284 In fact, this appears to be the approach
advocated by the NTA, which calls for an NTM that would "progressively
eliminate" transatlantic tariffs and non-tariff barri285
ers.
Perhaps the most common element of this progressive
approach lies in efforts to harmonize technical standards and
initiate mutual recognition agreements, as is characteristic of
the past seven years of the NTA.28 6 However, this approach may
create inconsistencies with the world's multilateral trading system and cause problems for countries outside of the scope of
such agreements. Mutual recognition agreements remain immune from free-riding by third countries, given that accession
requires a level of confidence in the quality and reliability of a
state's regulatory bodies, but such agreements will not be easily
converted for multilateral use.287 The piecemeal efforts of this
approach would preclude the NTM from becoming a free trade
area under GATT Article XXIV until it schedules the liberalization of "substantially all trade," thus precluding preferential
treatment for U.S. and EU production. 2"' Rather, the United
States and EU would be forced to offer the outcome of each
piecemeal, negotiated result, to other WTO members on a MFN
basis. 8 ' In effect, this approach opens the door for hostility from
third countries that free ride from U.S.-EU negotiations and an
unwillingness to continue to negotiate. These problems can be
avoided, however, if negotiations and agreements progress beyond the scope of the WTO and offer outside countries the opportunity to receive MFN or national treatment on the condition
they accede to the agreements and undertake the obligations
therein.8 °
In contrast to the progressive integration approach, the alternative means for actualizing the NTM, via a comprehensive
and quickly negotiated strategy, remains equally difficult. Agricultural issues related to subsidies and the use of innovative
technologies, such as genetically modified organisms, represent
a matter that may only be successfully negotiated through a
gradual, progressive approach. In addition, the criteria of GATT
Article XXIV and the MFN problem associated with the piece284. Steinberg, supra note 17, at 248.
285. Draft Communication, supra note 252.
286. See supra Part III.B.
287. See supra Part III.B.
288. Steinberg, supra note 17, at 248 (commenting on GATT, supra note 23, at
art. XX1V).
289. Id.
290. Id.
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meal approach likewise pervade the comprehensive plan, requiring accession to be open to third countries willing to undertake
the terms of the U.S.-EU agreement if Article XXIV criteria are
met, otherwise national treatment must be offered.2 9'
Along with the free-riding problem inherent in the conclusion of bilateral agreements under either approach to the NTM,
the internal legal structures of the United States and EU likewise raise questions as to the viability of an NTM. Variant federal, state, and municipal regulatory schemes in the United
States present countless headaches for EU officials and businesses, as highlighted in the Commission Report. 29' Likewise,
the refusal of European states to maintain policies consistent
with the regulatory procedures of the EU poses similar difficulties for U.S. companies and administrators. While these diverging internal regulatory schemes represent pivotal points of contention, no easy answers exist.
Long-term, sustained
integration seems to be the best answer, by which U.S. and EU
officials must seek to reconcile these internal trade barriers.
However, the length of time inherently involved in this process
will require a defined commitment to achieving harmonization
and uniformity, which will be problematic given the open door
for political animosity to disrupt the process.
Indeed, the role of politics is a fundamental problem in the
development of the NTM. Highly sensitive issues permeate the
scope of transatlantic trade, many of which demand resolution
before a free trade area can exist. Domestic settlement of issues
such as government procurement, agriculture subsidization, and
service barriers, will require focused and resolute leadership on
both sides of the Atlantic. In many ways, the priority of trade
liberalization must be fundamental, for political leaders dealing
with removing these trade barriers will be forced to variant positions on issues uncommonly coupled together. Public interest
groups and business sectors commonly allied with certain political parties will find themselves in conflict over trade policies,
implicating financial and political support problems, as well as
obstacles in the maintenance of positions of power. For the most
part, trade barriers exist for many defined and specific reasons,
reasons that unequivocally spell business sector protection.
Abridging these business protections by removing trade impediments and opening the doors to economic competition may

291.
292.

Steinberg, supra note 17, at 247.
Commission Report, supra note 162, at 13.
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be beneficial to consumers, but will not be welcomed by targeted
and affected companies. In turn, political turmoil will be a
likely consequence, possibly undermining the authority and
mandate of the political actors working towards the actualization of the NTM.
Though many political, logistical, legal, and social obstacles
remain in place, the NTM remains a viable concept that could
be realized gradually within several years. The institutional
framework of the NTA, the TEP, and the various dialogues will
aid in facilitating the NTM's development, but will only be successful with clearly defined goals and resolutions by U.S. and
EU officials. Through the progressive elimination of tariff and
non-tariff barriers advocated by the NTA, deep economic integration can occur and expand transatlantic trade relations. In
many ways, trade liberalization and integration works on a
slippery slope, where small steps towards these goals ultimately
mandates further and further steps. In actuality, the process
has already begun; a harmonized and synthesized transatlantic
economy will inevitably unfold given market demands - how
long the process will take and should take remains the question
to be answered.
CONCLUSION
As the paradigm of time continues to unfold, questions and
uncertainties remain unanswered and unfulfilled. With each
dawning day serving to clear the ambiguities of the fleeting
night, direction and certainty become more discernible and apparent. Likewise, as issues arose after the end of the Cold War
amidst U.S.-EU relations, clarity and guidance soon unfolded.
Goals for future economic and trade relations defined themselves in various agreements and dialogues, prompting aspirations for further trade liberalization and market integration. As
disputes and conflicts continued to arise over barriers to trade,
prevalent on both sides of the Atlantic, the idea for a marketplace free of restraints and obstruction to trade soon emerged.
Currently, the United States and EU stand on the frontier of realizing this lofty and ambitious aspiration. Questions ranging
from whether the NTM is even viable, to whether it is almost
inevitable, remain the subject of much discussion and debate.
The future maintains a monopoly over these answers. Where
U.S.-EU trade relations will go remains to be seen, as time's
grip will soon release these answers and reveal what the future
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holds on transatlantic relations.
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